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ST.\TE~IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought to fix and determine the 
correct purchase price to be paid to plaintiffs by defend-
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ants under a Bill of Sale dated April 2, 1932 and an 
Agreement dated April 6, 1932 relating to the sale then 
by plaintiffs to defendants of their undivided interests 
in the assets of Salt Lake ·Transfer Company. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
At the request of the plaintiffs, the trial of the 
case was divided into two phases, the first as to the in-
terpretation of the contractual relationships between the 
parties under the 1932 Agreement and determination of 
what measure of liability shall be applied. A separate 
trial was had thereafter to determine the amount of the 
purchase price payable to plaintiffs by defendants in 
which the trial court made, entered and filed its Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment on those issues. Therein the 
court construed the 1932 Bill of Sale and Agreement as 
requiring a June 3, 1960 valuation of the assets, sold by 
plaintiffs in 1932, 'vhereas defendants claim that the 
basis of valuation should be as of April of 1932. The 
court found that plaintiffs were not partners and that 
their 1932 Agree1nent was not void for fraud, mistake 
or undue influence. By a separate trial, the court then 
1nade Findings and entered Judgment against defendants 
for $181,841.07 as being the 1960 value of the undivided 
interests sold in 1932, together with unpaid interest. 
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RELII1JF SOl'OH'£ OX APPEAL 
l>•·fpndants ~l'Pk l'PYPrsal of the trial court's Find-
in~~ and .Judguwnts insofar as they adjudge that de-
t't•tHlant~ shall pay for the purchase of plaintiffs' share 
of t lw company a~~Pt~ as of their value on June 3, 1960 
nnd ask that those Findings and J udg1nents be reversed 
nnd that the trial court be directed to determine the value 
of Uw assets as of April 6, 19·32, the date of plaintiffs' 
Agreement Relating to Salt L~ake Transfer Company. 
Defendants also attack the valuations as determined by 
the court and ask for reduction of those sums. 
S'J.1ATEMENT OF FAOTS 
Prior to April 2, 1932 the Salt Lake Transfer Com-
pany was a partnership operating in Utah with its office 
in Salt Lake City, consisting of George H. Sims (father) 
and two of his sons, George A. Sims and Milton K. Sims. 
The respective interests of the partners at that time were 
as follows: 
Partner Shares in Assets Share in Profits 
George H. Sims 3j5 1/3 
George A. Sims 1j5 1/3 
~Iilton K. Sims 1/5 1/3 
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On April 2, 1932, just prior to his demise, the father 
executed his Bill of Sale (Exhibit P-A) transferring his 
"right, title and interest" in the company to his nine chil-
dren, each to have a 1j9th interest thereof (plaintiff 
Gladys S. Bullough actually received 2j9ths, one for her-
self and one for her brother, John.) Thus each child 
received from his and her father a 6.666% interest (lj9th 
of 3 j5ths) in the assets and 1/27 th ( 3. 711 o/o) interest in 
the profits. This, then vested in George A. Sims and 
Milton K. Sims, the two surviving partners, each 
10j27ths of the profits and 12/45th of the assets and 
they, on April 5, 1932, formed a new Salt Lake 'Transfer 
Company partnership ·with the two of them as sole part-
ners. (Exhibit D-'T) 
On April 6, 1932, the surviving children (grantees 
in the Bill of Sale) executed the Agreement Relating to 
Salt Lake Transfer C01npany (Exhibit P-B) whereby 
each of the plaintiffs, who never had been partners "here-
by sells and conveys" all of his or her interest, which they 
had just received from their father, to the two brothers 
as surviving partners, George A. and :Milton K., who 
agreed (paragraph 3) "upon six months demand from 
the person so selling, to pay for each one-ninth to pur-
chased one-ninth of the sum found as the value of the 
GEORGE H. SIMS interest as per Bill of Sale above 
mentioned." Then it was agreed that (paragraph 4) 
"until such purchase su1n is demanded or is paid, it will 
pay one-twenty-seventh of the net n1onthly profits, if any, 
for each ninth so purchased." 
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'rhP two brot h•·rs carried on thPir business as Salt 
Lake Tran~fer Company continuously frmn that date 
in .\ pri 1. I !l:~~ until death of l\lilton 1\:. Sims in 19'59. The 
t·o111pnny still <'ontinues under tPrms of a 1946 partner-
~hip agn·Pment bPhrPPn those two and tlwir sons, Grant 
0. Sim~ and Elmer L. Sims. (Exhibit D-L) Following 
~I ilton K. ·~ dNLth, discussions were had as to payment 
now to plaintiffs of the su1ns owing on the 1932 agreed 
~ale prie•• . The parties first agreed as to the amount 
to h•• paid and plaintiffs rejected a later tender of the 
pur<'ha~P price and accrued interest made to each of 
thl'm and filed this action June 3, 19,60. ·The trial court 
•·on::;t nwd such a filing as being the demand for payment 
n\fl•tTed to in paragraph 3 of the Agreement. (R. 111) 
The faets shown by the record, which appear to de-
fendants to sustain their contention that there was n 
sale made in 1932 based upon the 1932 values, the sale 
pricl\ hmn•yer not to be paid to plaintiffs as sellers until 
after ::;ix months de1nand, are as follows: 
1. the Bill of Sale from the father (Exhibit P-A) 
dated ~-\pril :2, 1932 prescribes "In any case any Grantee 
\\i:'ht>~ to withdraw his or her interest in the partnership 
prnperty. the value of the same shall be appraised by 
Glady~ ~. Bullough and George A. Si1ns and the figure 
~d by thesf• two shall be binding upon the withdrawing 
t~rantee"; 
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2. said two, Gladys (a plaintiff) and George A. (a 
defendant) did in fact execute in 1947 a valuation of the 
assets as of April1932 (Exhibits D - H and I), this was 
based upon the values as known to them and after a 
careful review of the books of the company by Mrs. Bul-
lough's husband. (R. 230, 243); 
3. the Bill of Sale (Exhibit P-A) and the Agree-
ment (Exhibit P-B) were executed in 19'32, the depth of 
the Depression, when money was not readily available 
to pay for the interests of the brothers and sisters; 
4. the said Agreement (Exhibit P-B) was a with-
drawal by plaintiffs from the partnership and states that 
in 1932 the plaintiffs had a present intention to sell 
then and defendants an intention to buy then and there, 
but there was a deferred time of payment as shown lJy 
the following tenns of said documents signed by plain-
tiffs: 
(a) first it recognized the former partnership re-
lationship of the father and two sons; 
(b) it acknowledged the Bill of Sale from the father 
dated April 2, 1932; 
(c) recites in preamble, "Whereas, these children 
of George H. Sims who have not been in the partnership 
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1 l"~ire to ~wll th('i r inh•rP~t in the partnership to the two 
rNnaining partners and the latter are willing to purchase 
t lw :-;:unt·"; 
(d) tlH•y "approve such Bill of Sale and of the 
tllt>thod thPrein ~wt forth for valuing the share owned 
hy < h•orgt> II. Sims at the time of the execution of such 
Bill of ~all•''; 
(e) the present Salt Lake Transfer Company is de-
~ignatPd a~ "n•ml<>Ps" and plaintiffs as "vendors"; 
(f) vendees are said to "hereby purchase and each 
of the vendors hereby sells and conveys"; 
(g) vendees assume all obligations of the former 
~alt Lake Transfer Company; 
(h) .. 3. The present Salt Lake Transfer Company 
a~n·Ps, upon six months demand from the person so 
~t·llin~. to pay for each one-ninth so purchased, one-
ninth of the sum found as the value of the GEORGE H. 
~I ~I~ interest as per the Bill of Sale above mentioned."; 
( i) "until such purchase sum is den1anded or is 
paid" vendees shall pay vendors one-twenty-seventh of 
tlw net monthly profits"; 
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(j) upon demand for the purchase price, "sellers 
right to share in the profits shall cease and he or she 
shall be entitled to interest on the sale price at six per 
cent per annum until paid"; 
(k) "purchaser shall be entitled at any time to pay 
any seller the purchase price for his share plus accrued 
net profits or interest, to date of payment"; 
(l) "each of the vendors" covenanted that no prior 
sale had been made by him or her. 
Since that time, in lieu of a stated percent of interest 
on the unpaid purchase price, plaintiffs have each re-
ceived as interest on such sale a sum equal to 1/27th of 
the net profits of the business, with a small sum being 
withheld occasionally with the knowledge and consent 
of plaintiffs. None of the plaintiffs have participated 
in the business since 1932 and the trial Court duly found 
(Par. 12 of Findings) that they were not partners sine<· 
the date of their Agremnent, April 6, 1932 (R. 111). 
Defendants acknowledged liability for and are ready 
to pay to the plaintiffs the value of the interest sold and 
purchased in April 1932 plus any unpaid interest as 
required by the Bill of Sale and the Agreement, but de-
fendants disagree with the trial Court's interpretation 
that said valuation is to be as of June 3, 19GO, the date 
of filing this action. After the trial of the initial phase, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
tlt•l'Pndant~ paid to plaintiffs $48,000.00, representing 
$".1100.00 earh. Plaintiffs have reePived and retained 
the intt>n·~t~ paytnents (3.711% of the profits each) since 
U):~:! without complaint or objection as to the validity 
of tlwir 1932 Agreement (R. 180, 221). None have par-
ti<'ipatPd in managenH'nt of Salt Lake Transfer, (R. 
~.-)~, :20:2, :2:21 ) • 
Tlw dPfendants contend that the Agreement should 
lw con~trued to mean that the purchase price is the value 
a~ of 1 !):~:! but it need not be determined until and when 
n dPmand for payment is made, and that at said time 
the purcha~P price will be fixed based on the valuations 
on tlw date of sale in 1932. In support of this the de-
l't•JHlant~ contend that the continued payment to plain-
tiff~ of a ~hare of the net profits is interest and is not 
indicia of a continued ownership interest in the assets 
of ~alt Lake Transfer C01npany. 'Yithin the meaning of 
their father'~ Bill of Sale, the Agreen1ent was a "with-
drawal" on April 6, 1932 by plaintiffs. 
:-;hortly after the death of ~I. K. Si1ns in 1959, 
~Pveral of the plaintiffs met with George A. Sims and 
a di:'<'ll~:'ion developed relative to cOinpletion of the sale 
and purchase of the family interests. At that time George 
offL·red to transfer to each one, stock having a value 
nf $1~.000.00. Each agreed that such was a fair price 
and pffort~ were 1nade to procure the stock that very 
day. hut the safe deposit box section of the bank was 
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closed (R. 184 and 208). The next day, George withdrew 
his offer after a discusion with his partners. This is 
the nearest bona fide valuation on an eye to eye basi~ 
between the actual parties hereto. 
It will be recalled that there were nine children at 
the time of their father's 1932 Bill of Sale. One of said 
nine, John Sims, had the same interest as each of the 
six plaintiffs. He is a businessman engaged in operating 
an automobile sales business in California. After the 
death of the brother, M. K. Sims and shortly prior to 
the filing of this case in 1960, he 1net with George A. 
Si1ns and agreed upon a valuation of $10,000.00 (R. 757 
and 769), which sum was then paid to him for his 1/27th 
interest. The six remaining family members, plaintiffs 
herein, have each obtained judgment for the same 1j27th 
interest for $27,358.88 plus $5,152.63 retained earnings, 
which was valued in its entirety by John at $10,000.00 
in 1960 and by several of the plaintiffs themselves at 
$18,000.00 in 1959 ( R. 187) and by Mrs. Bullough, an-
other plaintiff, in 19-!7 at $3,61-1-.41 exclusive of retained 
earnings (Exhibits D-H). 
In the second phase of the trial, the court took evi-
dence on the valuations of the assets as of June 3, 1960. 
Testimony as to values varied considerably and the 
details will be discussed in the Argument relating to 
Points VI, VII and VIII. ·The final gross valuation of 
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thl' a~~t't~ (Salt Lake Transfer plus Sims Realty) at 
$-llO.::~:L:~;> i~ a salvage value, but no allowance was given 
for the ('o~t~ of liquidation or salvage. 
The plaintiffs' Contentions raised at pre-trial for the 
fi r~t time the issues of "fraud, mistake, undue influence" 
(H. 85). The court required proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence on this issue ( R. 89). Not only was no 
proof given, but all of the plaintiffs testified that the 
only defendant present in 1932 when their Agreement 
was signed was their brother George A. Sims, and each 
one of them volubly expressed their great love and es-
teem for him (R. 136, 166-67, 194, 205, 21-1, 223). Finding 
Xo. 11 properly detennined that the 19'32 Agreement "is 
not Yoid or unenforceable on the grounds of fraud, mis-
take or undue influence" (R. 111). 
The remaining issue of fact was the contention of 
plaintiffs that they were partners in Salt Lake Transfer 
l~ompany and hence entitled to an ownership share in 
tlw a~8ets and to a winding up of the affairs because of 
tlw death of ~L 1{. Sims in 1959. The issues and facts 
on this phase will be discussed more in particular in 
reply to the plaintiff's Cross Appeal, sufficient at this 
time to note that the record reveals, first that plaintiffs 
~old out tlwir interests in 1932 to a partnership con-
~i::'ting of only two individuals, George A. Sims and 11. 
K. Sims (Exhibit P-B); next, the state regulatory bodies, 
l.C.C'. and Public Service Connnission of rtah never 
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recognized any plaintiff as a partner, (Exhibits D-0, 
D-P, D-Q, D-R, D-S); none of the plaintiffs testified 
that any of them had participated in manage1nent at any 
time (19·32 to now) (R. 158, 202, 2.21); and the only 
semblance of partnership evidence was that the income 
tax returns after 1941 reflected plaintiff's names as part-
ners, though the testimony and returns are clear that 
prior to that time only the two true partners were shown, 
George A. and M. K. Sims, but in 1941 the Internal 
Revenue Service required the change for tax purposes. 
The court found (R. 111) "12. Plaintiffs and defendants 
were not partners at any time since April G, 1932." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A VALID SALE AND PURCHASE OF PLAINTIFFS' 
FRACTIONAL INTERE<BTS WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN 
APRIL 1932 WITH THE THEN AGREED PURCHASE PRICE 
TO BE PAID AT A LATER DATE. 
The historical background of this matter helps us 
to view the issues as the parties must have viewed them 
when the two docun1ents were signed in 1932 relating 
to the assets of Salt Lake ·Transfer Company. ·The father 
had been ill and he executed a Bill of Sale transferring 
his 3/5th interest in Salt Lake Transfer Company to his 
nine children just prior to his de1nise (Exhibit P-A.) 
During the four day interim betwePn his dPmise and 
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tht• t'nnPral, thP two surviving partners, Oeorge A. Si1ns 
und ~litton K. Sim~ fornwd the "present" Salt Lake 
'rransfer ( 1ompany partnership and following the fa-
t ltl'r·~ funeral, the plaintiffs, together with their two 
brother~. the surviving partners, executed the Agreement 
Bl'lating to ~alt Lake Transfer Company, (Exhibit P-B ). 
The hu~itw~~ would have floundered had not the two 
~nrviving partners made an effective arrangement to 
hny out the fractional interests of their brothers and 
~i~tt·r~ acquired under the father's Bill of Sale. How-
t'\'Pr, the two partners did not have the money with which 
to pay tlw purchase price then because of the severe 
Depression conditions, and hence agreed that they would 
pay such purchase price at a future date when demanded 
hy the sellers or earlier, at the election of the buyers. 
In the meantime, in lieu of interest which might have 
heen vt>ry oppressive had a fixed rate been set during 
this Depression period, the partners agreed to pay to 
their brothers and sisters each 1/27 of the net profits 
of the business until the purchase price was demanded. 
There can be no doubt as to the intent of a present 
Rale and purchase of those interests acquired from the 
father, as the Agree1nent (Exhibit P-B) uses the present 
ten::-;l' in the references thereto : the first being that the 
plaintiffs "desire to sell their interest"· the next the 
' ' 
defendants as the remaining partners "are willing to 
purchase the same." Then, the undersigned being all 
of the children, "approve such Bill of Sale and the meth-
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od therein set forth for valuing the share owned by 
George H. Sims." 'This valuing is recited to be "at the 
time of the execution of such Bill of Sale." Obviously, 
four days after the execution of the Bill of Sal<·, there 
was no reason for including such language relating back 
to the Bill of Sale time unless it was the intention of all 
parties that the property should be valued as of said 
date, namely, April 2, 1932. That language referred to 
above was in the preamble of the Agreement and con-
stituted the "withdrawal" referred to in tlw father's 
Bill of Sale. 
Paragraph 1 of Exhibit P-B states that "each in-
tends to be legally bound hereby." Such, of course, is 
in the present tense. Paragraph 2 recites that the "ven-
dees hereby purchase and each of the vendors hereby 
sells and conveys." Such is certainly an unequivocal an<l 
unambiguous declaration of sale and purchase rather 
than agreement to sell and purchase in the future. Said 
paragraph 2 also includes the language "said purchast·rs 
hereby assume all obligations of the fonner partnership 
and agree to pay the smne." Once again, this 'ras a 
present assumption of the past obligations of the de-
ceased father and other partners ·which then and thrn•, 
relieved the plaintiffs of any obligation tlwreon. 
The third paragraph recites that the "present Salt 
Lake Transfer Company agrees, upon six months demand 
of the person so selling, to pay for each 1/9 so pur-
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ehast>d 1/9 of the su1n found as the value as per the Bill 
of Sale above 1nentioned." Here is the first future 
temw exprPHsion in the Agreeinent and it refers solely 
to the time of payment, and ties down the amount to 
hP paid at such future date to the value of the father's 
interPHt "as per the Bill of Sale." A Creditor-Debtor 
relationship was ereated then and there, not a promise 
to buy or an option to buy. 
In the next paragraph, defendants agree that "until 
such purchase sum is demanded or is paid" that 1/27 
of the net monthly profits will be paid and that after 
~urh demand the interest on the sale price shall be 6% 
per annum until paid rather than a continuation of the 
interest predicated upon 1/27 of the net nwnthly profits, 
if any. In paragraph 6 the plaintiffs as "vendors" in 
the present tense, warrant that no prior sale or transfer 
of their interest ''in the old partnership" has been made. 
The relationship continued on through the Depres-
~ion days and thereafter until following the death of 
~l. K. ~ims in 1959. Neither the sellers demanded their 
money, nor did the buyers offer to pay the agreed 
purchase price, though either party and any one of the 
sellers had the option to do so earlier. In the meantime, 
the intere8t obligation was paid to the family members 
a~ sellers annually, with a few exceptions, until the 
filing of this litigation. Defendants acknowledge that 
they must pay the balance owing on the unpaid accrued 
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interest to date of said law suit and also must pay 6% 
interest on the purchase price from date of filing the 
law suit until judgment. 
That a valid sale and purchase was intended and 
accomplished then in 1932, may be seen clearly from the 
Agreement itself by use of the words in it normally 
associated with a present sale and purchase: 
(Exhibit P-B) 
Preamble-
"desire to sell their interest" -
"willing to purchase" 
Paragraph 2 -
"vendee hereby purchases"-
"each of the vendors hereby sells 
and conveys" 
Paragraph 3 -
"the person so selling" -
Paragraph 4 -
"the purchase sum" 
"interest on the sale price." 
Paragraph 5 -
"the purchaser" - "any seller" 
Paragraph 6 -
'vendors" -
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\V e can think of no words of art or of common usage 
whieh could be used which would more clearly and with-
out ambiguity express the intent and fact of a present 
sale and a present purchase between the plaintiffs as 
":-;ellPr~" and "vendors" to their two brothers, the sur-
viving partners who had formed the "present Salt Lake 
TransfPI' Company" as "purchaser" and "vendee." 
The fact of an accomplished present sale and present 
purchase was in no manner diminished by the future 
ptt)1nent provisions. The former partnership with their 
fath(•r had ended by his death on April 2nd. On April 
5th, the two surviving partners George and M. K. (Ex-
hibit D-T) formed the "present Salt Lake Transfer 
Company" and filed with the Salt Lake County Clerk 
their Affidavit of Assumed N arne, the next month. Part 
of the brothers and sisters were here from out of the 
state for the father's funeral and each had a lj15th 
interest which had been acquired four days before from 
their father. The two partners then and there bought 
tho~P seven fractional interests which were outstanding. 
The two partners agreed to pay for such when 
demanded and provided for interest until such purchase 
price was de1nanded at lj27th of the net profits and at 
6% per annum after demand and until paid. Nothing 
inconsistent with a present sale and purchase is to be 
inferred from the delay in payment of the purchase 
price. The relationship of the 1932 Depression years to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
the deferment of the payment of the then agreed pur-
chase price is understandable as well as the payment 
of interest on a percentage of profits basis rather than 
a fixed rate per annum. 
POINT II 
THE BILL OF SALE AND THE AGREEMENT EXE-
CUTED IN 1932 ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMI'T'TING PAROLE EVIDENCE 
OF PLAINTIFF'S TO VARY OR "INTERPRET" SAME. 
POINT III 
THE AGREED PURCHASE PRICE WAS THE VALUE 
IN APRIL 1932 AND THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING 
THE BILL OF SALE AND THE AGREEMENT AS REQUIR-
ING PAYMENT BY DEFENDENT'S OF A PURCHASE PRIOE 
BASED ON A 1960 VALUATION. 
'The passage of time from 1932 to 1960, ·wherein an 
Agreement between the parties has not been challenged 
and no differences have arisen, seems to give some 
sanctity to the Agreement and indicate that it was not 
mnbiguous. The very language itself is stated in clear, 
common terms which are easily understandable. The 
history of its execution and the Depression period make 
the contract logical. 
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For tlw plaintiffs to succeed in their attack upon 
thPir brother, George, for wh01n they profess so much 
lovP in their testimony, they must twist their Agreement 
from a prt:>sPnt sale and purchase transaction to a deal 
to buy and sell an interest at some later date. This has 
been done by parole evidence over objections of defend-
ants. At the very inception of this attempt by plaintiffs, 
objections were raised. 'The first plaintiffs' witness was 
~I r~. \Vinifred S. McDonald and objections were raised 
as soon as the issues of parole evidence arose and the 
('Otnt gave defendants a continuing objection (R. 138). 
Then at R. 1-t-1 we find: 
" ... MR. PUGSLEY: We object to this testi-
mon~· on the grounds that apparently it's trying 
to lay a premise for altering. May we have a con-
tinuing objection to this line f' 
THE COURT: "You may have a continuing 
objection as to parole evidence." 
~imilar objections were made and granted as to 
other plaintiffs when they testified, but the court pro-
CPeded to hear the evidence. 
The creditor-debtor relationship was established in 
1932. At that tune and for some years afterwards 
David Bullough, husband of plaintiff, Gladys S. Bul-
lough, was the bookkeeper at Salt Lake Transfer Com-
pany. Ht:> was an accountant in his own right and sent 
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out statements annually to the plaintiffs (family mem-
bers) showing the amount of interest paid to each one 
during the preceding year by way of 1/27th of the 
net profits. Exhibit D-F is one such notice, it having 
been produced from the files of Mrs. George S. Malquist 
(R .189). 'This exhibit refers to the year 1940 and was 
sent out by 1\ir. Bullough February 22, 1941 to the plain-
tiffs who were designated by Mr. Bullough as "creditors 
of Salt Lake Transfer Con1pany." Bullough's own letter-
head, manifests the understanding of the parties at a 
time much closer to 1932 than the plaintiffs oral self-
serving declarations at a trial in 19·62. 
Plaintiffs have received and retained the benefits 
of their Agreement of April 6, 1932 throughout the yt>ars 
and now have tortured their sales agree1nent into some-
thing entirely foreign from the expressed intention of 
the parties at the time of execution thereof. There are 
no ambiguities in the Agreement which would leave room 
for extraneous oral interpretations by the parties, as 
the present tense language of "vendors" and "a vendee" 
selling and buying is clear and un1nistakable. Plaintiffs 
would have this Court believe, and successfully convinced 
the trial Court, that they had merely agreed to sell their 
interests, which they received frmn their father, at some 
future date wholly undetermined and at a price for 
·which no formula or tin1e schedule was encompassed in 
the agreement. 
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rrhe father in his Bill of ~alP, prescribed that the 
oldPst son and the oldest daughter, namely George H. 
~imH and Gladys ~im~ Bullough should, on behalf of all 
of the ehildren detennine the value of tlw interest which 
hP <·onvt·~· .. d to them in April, 1932. 
The Agreement expressly acknowledges the acquisi-
tion by tlH• plaintiffs of their interests under the Bill of 
~alP, and all of the parties .. approve of such Bill of Sale 
and of tlw method therein set forth for valuing the share 
owned by George H. Sims at the time of the execution 
of such Bill of Sale.'' What is the reason for them agree-
ing to the valuing of the share at the time of the execu-
tion of such Bill of Sale if this was merely an agreement 
to sell at a future date at some value to be fixed as and 
when this pretended option of purchase has been exer-
ei~t>d, or the option to sell has been declared by the 
plaintiffs? It would be unique in contract history for 
parties to agree to sell at an undetermined future date 
for an undetermined future price, the time and price 
to be ascertaniable and determined by any of the eight 
parties to the Agreement and hence different of each one. 
\Y e have outlined above the details of the Agreement 
it~Plf and its overwhelming language making clear the 
intention of the parties to sell and the intention of 
the partiPs to buy, and reciting in present terms the 
~ah\ and the purchase of the interests which the plaintiffs 
acquired frOin the father. There is nothing unusual in 
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such an arrangement as the common business experience 
in the purchase of an automobile or a residence, or in 
the purchase of many other items of personal property 
or business interests are made upon an installmc>nt pur-
chase program, or upon a future payment program. 
Particularly, there was nothing unusual during the De-
pression years for the parties to defer the time of pay-
ment of an agreed purchase price and to covenant to 
pay interest to the seller until the said purchase price 
has been paid in full. The ordinary real estate contract 
is typical of such a transaction where the purchase price 
is payable at the future date, either in a lump sum or an 
installn1ent progrmn with interest payable during the 
interim and with an option upon either the seller or the 
buyer to accelerate or define the future payment date 
by either the purchaser electing to pay on or before a 
certain date or by the seller electing to require the 
purchaser to refinance the sale through some financial 
institution as prescribed by the contract. 
The only substantial difference in this transaction 
between the ordinary present sale and purchase of a 
business or property is the covenant that the purchasers 
shall receive a percentage of the "net monthly profits, 
if any, for each ninth so purchased." Such an arrange-
ment has been recognized in connnercial transactions for 
many years, either the percentage of the profits of a 
business sold or the percentage of the income on the 
property sold in lieu of interest. \V e direct the attention 
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of tlw eourt to the provisions of the Unifonn Partner-
:-;hip Ad, ~Pe. -t.S-1--t., which reads in part: 
.. (-!) The receipt by a person of a share of 
a business is prilna facie evidence that he is a 
partner in the business, but no such inference 
shall be drawn if such profits were received in 
paymPnt: 
* * * * * 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the 
amounts of payment vary with the profits 
of the business." 
The transaction between the parties resulted in a 
present sale and present purchase of the undivided inter-
est~ in the then assets of Salt Lake Transfer Company. 
Possession thereof was delivered and held continuously 
~inee April 1932 by the defendants. The plaintiffs have 
not since that period of time exercised or attempted to 
Pxercise any dominion over such assets so sold by them 
and this is further evidence of their "withdrawal." The 
relationship of debtor-creditor was established. The 
isstw of whether the plaintiffs had a vendor's lien on 
the property for the unpaid purchase price has not been 
raised, but beyond that possibility, no contingency or 
remaining interest in the assets was vested in the plain-
tiffs following the sale on April 6, 1932. They had a 
right to be paid the unpaid purchase price, and they 
had a right to be paid the agreed interest thereon, but 
no higher or better interest, and absolutely no continuing 
ownership share in the assets. 
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The fact that there was no continuing interest in 
the assets is clearly de1nonstrated by the court's finding 
that the parties were not partners after April 6, 1932. 
The fact is that the Certificate of Publie Convenience 
and Necessity subsequently issued by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah, as well as the titles to the real property, 
at no time showed an interest in the plaintiffs. 
It is submitted to the court that the language of 
the Agreement is clear and unambiguous as to the fact 
of a present sale on April 6, 1932 of the then assets 
and the purchase thereof coupled with an obligation to 
pay the said purchase price based upon the value of the 
assets on the date of the father's Bill of Sale, four days 
prior thereto, as and when the sellers' demandt>d their 
money. There was only an obligation to pay the interPst 
as prescribed by the Agreenwnt in the meantime. 
\V e are highly a wan' of plaintiffs' attempts to make 
something different of this Agree1nent by speculation 
and inuendo and by hypotheses and by inferences. No 
1natter how much they "suppose'' the language, there is 
no legal basis for reversal of the clear and dir~ct lan-
guage of the plaintiffs as "sellers" or "vendors" in the 
Agreement that each "}H-'n•by sells and conveys.'' This 
is not a mere option to sell in the future, nor a contract 
to sell in the future. It was a transfer and conveyance 
that very date, April 6, 193:2. The Court should not 
write a new contract for the parties. 
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That tlw defendants permitted the plaintiffs to con-
tinue on for an extended period of time, thereby benefit-
ing hy t hP interest payment~ by way of 1/27th of the 
net profits for twPnty-seven years, is not to be held 
as prejudieial to defendants' rights. Had anyone or 
mon· of the six plaintiffs elected to do so, they could 
have called for their money in 1932 or any year there-
after. Rather, they liked this type interest on the unpaid 
purcha~P price, and gladly received and retained such 
inh•rt>st payments. 
FPw eitations are needed to show the rule on con-
tract interpretation that where the language is clear, 
a~ it i~ here on the issue of a present sale and purchase 
in l~);t~, such n1ay not be tortured into some other 
meaning by construction or extraneous oral evidence. 
Likl•wi~e when a document of sale has been duly exe-
euted and delivered as in this case in 1932, one seeking 
to alter or modify the same must present clear and con-
vincing evidence, see Naisbitt v. Hodges, 307 P. 2d 620, 
6 lTt. 2d 116; Pender v. Anderson, 235 P. 2d 360, 120 
rt. 399. 
It seems apparent from the relationship of the 
parties on April 6, 1932 that this was a clear agreement 
of the six plaintiffs to sell to their two elder brothers 
who were the surviving partners, the interests received 
from their father under his Bill of Sale. Having this 
in mind plus the present tense language of buy and 
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sell, vendor and vendee, buyers and sellers. We call 
to the court's attention a few of the more recent ex-
pressions relating to contract interpretation. 
Maw v. Noble, 354 P. 2d 121, 10 Ut. 2d 440: 
"We are in agreement with the well-recog-
nized rule urged by the defendants that where 
there is uncertainty or ambiguity the contract 
should be strictly construed against him who 
draws it. But it is to be kept in mind that this 
rule applies only where there is some genuine 
lack of certainty, and not to strained or merely 
fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be 
indulged in. The primary and a more fundamen-
tal rule is that the contract must be looked at 
realistically in the light of the circumstances 
under which it 'vas entered into, and if the intent 
of the parties can be ascertained with reasonabl<> 
certainty it must be given effect." 
Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 323 P. 2d 259, 7 Ut. 2d 
276: 
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts 
we seek to determine the intentions of the parties. 
But it is also ele1nentary and of extreme practi-
cal importance that we hold contracting parties 
to their clear and understandable language delib-
erately committed to writing and endorsed by 
thein as signatories thereto. Were this not so, 
business one with another among our citizens, 
v{ould be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic 
purpose of the law to supply enforceable rules 
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of conduct for the maintPnance and improvement 
of an ordPrly society's welfare and progress would 
find itself impotent. It is not unreasonable to 
hold one responsible for language which he him-
~df espouses. Such language is the only imple-
ment he gives us to fashion a deternunation as 
to the intt,ntions of the parties. Under such cir-
<·nm~tances, we should not be required to em-
bosom any request that we ignore that very 
language. This is as it should be. 'The rule 
Pxcluding matters outside the four corners of a 
clear, understandable document, is a fair one, 
and one's contentions concerning his intent should 
Pxh·nd no further than his own clear expressions." 
lrestern Development Co. v. Nell, 288 P. 2d 452, ± 
rt. :!<l 11~: 
" ... where the intention of the parties can 
he ascertained from the instrument, arbitrary 
rules of law as to construction will not be invoked. 
Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Ut. 345, 85 P. 2d 861." 
Driggs v. Ftah State Teachers Retirement Board, 
1-t~ P. ~d 657, 105 l;t. 417: 
"Our own court referred to this same princi-
ple in Schofield v. Zion's C.l\LI., supra, at page 
~SS of the Utah report, 39 P. 2d at page 345: 'It 
is elemental, in construing a contract, that its 
purpose, its nature, and subject-matter should 
be considered. A construction giving an instru-
ment a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will 
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be adopted when it can reasonably be done, and 
between two possible constructions that will be 
adopted which establishes a valid contract.'" 
It is not disputed that the Bill of Sale and Agreement 
were drafted by Mr. Irwin Clawson, attorney for the 
Salt Lake Transfer Company at that time. Equally, 
the plaintiffs do not dispute that they knew or could 
have known of the contract provision for 28 years and 
yet they accepted its benefits for that period of time 
before they raised any questions. 
We do not find within these documents such am-
biguities as would require the trial court to construe 
language adverse to defendants. The plain, clear and 
ordinary language of "buy and sell" means exactly that. 
No future sale was contemplated, intended or expressed. 
Merely a delayed payment date ·was left for the future. 
That the plaintiffs knew and understood their 
Agreement or had an ample opportunity to know its 
contents and import for 28 years before raising a ques-
tion, is shown by s01ne of their testimony. None testified 
as to any refusal to give copies to them. :Mrs. l\1:cDonald 
said that she'd never asked for a copy (R. 150). Mrs. 
Hannibal testified that she, in 1932, had asked her older 
brothers, Lou and Cleve (two of the plaintiffs) if it 
was alright to sign and had been told "yes" (R. 166-67) 
and later she received a copy of the Agre(~Inent (Exhibit 
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P-B). ~I r. Cleveland J(. Sims "Cleve" testified that 
n ('opy of thP Agreement was given to him at the ti1ne 
of signing (H. H)9). 
~Irs. Hannibal, who then lived in Everett, Washing-
ton, tPstit'iPd that after she was home, she took her copy 
of tht> Agreement "to the finest attorneys on the Coast" 
(H.. 17~). None expressed any misunderstanding of the 
tt>rllls during this long period. The parties were in fre-
qtwnt communication with each other. Plaintiffs them-
st~ln's characterized their relationship with George and 
:\1. K. as a "more united family, the most clanish family 
l hnvP ever known" (l\1rs. Malquist R. 213). Regular 
('lweks were remitted monthly to the plaintiffs and an-
nual state1nents were sent to them as "creditors of Salt 
Lake Transfer Co." (Exhibit D-F) for 28 years, still 
no complaints or contentions of a different intent or 
understanding. 
\Y e submit that the plaintiffs knew they had made 
a sale, knew they were not partners, accepted and re-
tained the benefits of their Agreement for 28 years 
before complaining and thus estopped themselves from 
now attempting to vary the terms of their Agreement. 
Their oral, self-serving declarations that they thought 
they were partners is negatived by their conduct. No such 
parole evidence should have been admitted to vary their 
1 ~l;i~ Agreement. 
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POINT IY 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT NO PARTNER-
SHIP EVER EXISTED BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DE-
FENDANT'S; AND PLAINTIFFS HAVE ESTOPPED THEM-
SELVES FROM AS8ERTING A PARTNERSHIP WITH DE-
FENDANTS. 
After 28 years of dormancy, plaintiffs have sudden-
ly asserted themselves as "partners." The obvious reason 
is that such would reap for them a share in the prt>sent 
assets of Salt Lake Transfer Company as they have 
increased in value. ·This scheme would relieve plaintiff's 
from their sale made in 1932. The plaintiffs, thus, had 
individually and collectively great financial temptations 
before them to claim the relationship of partners with 
their brothers George and l\L l(. 
None denied the execution of the Agreeuwnt in 1932, 
where they sold and the "present Salt Lake Transfer 
Company" (George and l\f. K.) purchased the fractional 
interests given to planitiffs four days before by their 
father's Bill of Sale. Not one testified that he or she 
had participated in the n1anage1nent of the c01npany from 
that day forward. None of the plaintiffs had owned any 
share in the company before or after said April 19:3~ 
Agreement, except for four days, between their fatlwr'~ 
Bill of Sale on April 21, 19·32 and their own Agreement 
on April 6, 1932. No partnership agn·t>1nent was ev<'l' 
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~ignt>d hy plaintiffs, but the actual partners had such 
partnPrship agreements and had duly filed their Affi-
davit~ of doing business under the assumed name of Salt 
Lake Transfer Company in 1932 (Exhibit D-'T) and in 
19~7 (Exhibit D-e). In the face of such facts and their 
prot'P~~P<l love for their elder brother, George, one 
would think that after 28 years the plaintiffs would be 
uttPrly embarrassed to attempt to be considered as 
partners at this late date and to demand a liquidation 
of the finn. Two items of evidence were introduced in 
their futile effort to overturn their 1932 Agreement and 
claim a~ partnPrs; 
(a) self-serving parole declarations that they 
thought they were partners (attempt to vary the terms 
of their 1932 Agreement) ; and 
(b) Income tax returns of the cmnpany after 1941, 
which referred to the distribution of the shares of profits 
- (interest under the 1932 Agreement) as going in part 
to the plaintiffs as "partners" (Exhibit P-K and P-J). 
One of the definitions of a partnership is "an associ-
ation of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners 
a business for profit." 48-1-3 e.C.A. 1953. In light of 
this language, let us evaluate the relationship created in 
1~):~:2 by the Agreen1ent signed by the plaintiffs. Except 
for the parole declarations of the plaintiffs, no sein-
hlanre of a partnership existed. The plaintiffs sold as 
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"vendors" to "the present Salt Lake Transfer Company, 
a co-partnership consisting of George A. Sims and Mil-
ton K. Sims, vendees ... " (Exhibit P-B). The next 
paragraph refers to plaintiffs selling their interest 
(which they had received from their father four days 
before) in "the former Salt Lake Transfer Company to 
"the present Salt Lake Transfer Company, a co-part-
nership, vendee." 
The preamble refers to the three partners in the old 
Salt Lake Transfer Company, George H. (the father), 
George A. and Milton K. Sims and then describes the 
father's Bill of Sale of April 2, 1932 and then state~ 
that the plaintiffs, "children of George H. Sims who 
have not been in the partnership," desire to sell their 
interests "to the two remaining partners and the latter 
are willing to purchase the same and have organized a 
partnership hereinafter described as the present Salt 
Lake Transfer Company." These plaintiffs were hard 
put in trying to contend that they were partners in 
Salt Lake Transfer Company after that. The trial court 
properly found that they were not such partners. 
The remaining contentions of plaintiffs on this 
abortive partnership claim, seems tied to the combina-
tion of payment to plaintiffs of a per cent of the profits 
and that their nmnes appeared on tax notices after 1941. 
We've made it clear before that this percentage of profits 
was a method of interest pay1nent namely 1/27th each 
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of tht> ··net monthly profits, if any'' and in the same 
pnragraph stah•s that after demand of payment, "he 
or :-;Itt> shall be entitled to interest on the sale price at 
~ix }H'l' <'Pnt IH'l' anntun until paid." This manifests a 
('l'(lditor-dPhtor relationship. 
r~xhibits P-J, P-I{ are income tax returns of the 
parhwrship, beginning with the calendar year 1932 and 
continuing on. An inspection of the 1933 returns shows 
the two partiwrs, George A. and Milton K. Sims plus 
"mi~e. minor inten'st," which referred to the distribution 
to the plaintiffs. The same designation was used in 1934 
and Hl:~3. In 1936 there was designated "interest credited 
to mi~<·. members." 
rrhe 1937 return did not indicate any credit to plain-
tiff:5. The 1938 return showed as partners only, George 
.\.and ~[ilton I{. Sims. The 1939 return showed the same 
two names, then, with the designation "others (see 
schedule att.),'' then the names of the six plaintiffs were 
reflected. 1940 followed the identical procedure. 1941 
showed the two partners George A. Sims and M. K. Sims, 
along with the plaintiffs under schedule 'J,' "partners 
share of income and credits." Basically this same pattern 
then followed for the remainder of the years until after 
the death of :JI. l(. Sims in 1959. 
It is to be recalled that the change in showing the 
nanlt•s of all of the plaintiff's under the schedule was 
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explained, first by defendant, Grant G. Si1ns (record 
281): 
Q .... "Did you do anything at that time to 
complain about listing in the income tax return 
under the heading of schedule I, Partners' Share 
of Income and Credits where it says schedule 
attached showing presumably all twelve partners; 
I assume that didn't alarm you f' 
A .... "Throughout the - -" 
Q. "First, would you answer my question. I 
asked you if that concerned or alarmed you and 
then make any explanation you want, please." 
MR. PUGSLEY: "Just a moment. The ques-
tion covers a lot of territory. I think the witness 
ought to be allowed to answer in his own words." 
Q. (By Mr. Berol) "Very well. Please go 
ahead in your own words." 
A. "There has been doubt as to handling 
this distribution of profits. In 1937 the family 
accepted a note. In many instances the reporting 
thereof has been a long term indebtedness, inter-
est on note -" 
Q. "l\fr. Silns, I'1n talking about this return 
of 1946." 
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A. ·· \Vt>ll, I'm leading up to that. You have 
a~kP<l me wlwthPr or not I ·was concerned. I'n1 
IPa<ling up to an~wPr you how I was alarmed and 
how I have been disturbed over it. I went to my 
partner Ebner and I asked him why there has 
hP~n a varianeP in reporting this, and he told 
lllP that at that ti1ne there was a letter from the 
lntPrnal Revenue to put this distribution of prof-
its someplace, and they designated it as a "Special 
Partner." Prior to 1940 it showed various ways 
of accounting it. The Internal Revenue, as I con-
sider the1n, are not desirous of knowing how it 
comes to them except how much and under what 
ela~~ifications. And they gave us the term ''Spe-
<'ial Partner." Not an agreement or anything 
PbP, and for accounting purposes some auditor 
in the Internal Revenue Service placed those 
words in the mouth of our accountant and they 
havP been carried forward as such." 
Elmer L. Sims testified that he had been the office 
manager for the past fifteen years and had become 
familiar with the books and records and had signed an-
nual reports for the Interstate Commerce Commission 
of th~ ~tatP of ·[tah, (Record 294) and that at no time 
were tllP fmnily me1nbers, who were the plaintiffs, shown 
a~ partners on such reports to the Interstate Commerce 
Conm1ission. 
Exhibits D-0, D-P, D-Q, are photostats of a permit 
and two certificates issued by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to the Salt Lake Transfer Company in 
1941, 1943, and 1948, re::;pechvely. The first two bear 
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the names "George A. Sims and M. K. Sims, a partner-
ship, doing business as Salt Lake Transfer Company, 
Salt Lake City, Utah," and the third one shows George 
A. Sims, M. IC. Sims, Elmer L. Sims, and G. Grant Sims, 
a partnership, doing business as Salt Lake Transfer 
Company, Salt Lake City, lTtah. 
Exhibits D-R and D-S are certified copies of docu-
ments issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
the first being based on a hearing in 1938 and duly 
issued in 1939. On page two finds: 
"On the 6th day of l\iarch, 1934, George A. Sims 
and Milton K. Sims, a partnership doing business at 
Salt Lake City, Utah in the firm name of the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company, filed an application with the Public 
Utilities Commission for a permit under the provisions 
of Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1933, to operate motor 
vehicles for hire as a "contract carrier of property" in 
intrastate commerce over and upon "all highways and 
any where in the State of Utah." This application was 
docketed as Case 15-1-!," and on page 3 finds: 
"On April 3, 1936, and subsequent to the enactment 
of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, George A. Sims 
and Milton K. Si1ns, doing business as the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company, again filed an application for a con-
tract carrier pern1it under the provisions of Chapter 65, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, in which they sought authority to 
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l•ngage in the transportation of property on occasional 
hauls ovt>r all the highways of the State of Utah, (Case 
~o. 1849). On the same day, the Public Utilities Com-
mission without a }H·aring granted to said applicants, 
Contrad Carrier Permit No. 123, authorizing them to 
pngage in the transportation of property by motor ve-
hiclP ovPr all highways of the State of Utah without 
any rt>strictions as to commodities or routes," and on 
the appointed order, being Certificate of Convenience 
and Xt>ePssity #51'2, issues the certificate to "George 
A. Sims and .M. K. Sims, a partnership, doing business 
as ~alt Lake Transfer Company." 
Exhibit D-S is a report and tentative order issued 
hy the Public Service Commission of Utah, August 24, 
1948 "and therein it recites the formation of the part-
nership in 1947, of George A. Sims, M. K. Sims, Elmer 
L. Sims, and Grant G. Sims, dba as a partnership under 
the name of Salt Lake Transfer Company" and trans-
fL·r~ to the said partnership of four individuals, the 
t•xaet operating rights then held by George A Sims 
and ~f. l(. Si1ns, a partnership dba Salt Lake Transfer 
Company. 
Our Partnership Act, Section 48-1-4 (3) reads: 
''The sharing of gross return does not of 
itself establish a partnership, whether or not 
the persons sharing them have a joint or com-
mon right or interest in any property from which 
the returns are derived." 
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and Section 48-1-4 ( 4) (d) reads: 
"The receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that 
he is a partner in the business, but no such in-
ference shall be drawn if such profits were re-
ceived in payment: 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the 
amounts of payment vary ·with the profits of the 
business." 
Now this parole evidence as to a partnership where-
in under direct examination by their own counsel, each 
parroted the thought that he or she was a partner, 
was negatived by their adJ.nissions that in the 28 year 
period not one had in any manner, participated in man-
ageement or even attempted to so participate. The bur-
den of proof ·was upon these plaintiffs to prove partner-
ship. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 rtah 582, 39 P.2d 1113. 
In that case an accounting and dissolution was sought 
and the partnership relationship was denied. The Utah 
Supreme Court held, among other things, that there was 
no partnership. "A partnership agree1nent, like any 
other express contract, requires a meeting of the minds 
of the parties thereto." "In an action by alleged partner 
for accounting and dissolution of partnership, plaintiff 
has burden of proving the existence of tlw partnership." 
In our case, no 1neeting of u1inds occurred as to 
the plaintiffs becoming partners and they certainly have 
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failed in their burden of proof. They did not convince 
thP trial Court and no substantial evidence of partner-
ship appears. in the record. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGA-
TION THAT THEIR 1932 AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCE-
ABLE OR VOID BECAUSE OF FRAUD, MIST'AKE OR UN-
DUE INFLUENCE AND THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND ENFORCE-
ABLE. 
r.rhe plaintiffs were singularly silent as to any alle-
gations of fraud, mistake or undue influence in their 
two romplaints and their amended cornplaint. It was 
not until the actual day of pre-trial that the plaintiffs' 
attorney presented a document designated as "Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Facts, Contentions and Issues." There 
the n'ry first contentions were "fraud, rnistake and 
undue influence" and this bombshell was followed by 
~t~\·eral diverse and inconsistent positions relating to 
partnership or non-partnership status. 
This fraud clain1 n1ust have been a surprise to 
plaintiffs as they did not even know they were suing 
th~'ir brother George. Plaintiff, ~[rs. Hannibal was 
a~ked about signing the Agreement on April 6, 1932 and 
told of asking her older brothers Cleve and Lou if they 
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thought it alright for her to sign and then, in response 
to their approval, she signed (R. 17 4). She testified 
in part: 
Q. "You not only trusted George, but you 
also trusted Cleve and you trusted Lou, didn't 
you~" 
A. "Why certainly." 
Q. "And you still love and trust and respect 
them all, don't you f' 
A. "That's right." 
Q. "Even though you are suing George and 
the others f' 
A. "I'm not suing George. I'm suing the 
Salt Lake ·Transfer Company, I think. Isn't 
that right~" 
When she was asked about her intention to sue her 
brother George, her own counsel objected and asserted 
that she was bound by his actions. 
When "Cleve," plaintiff Cleveland l{elly Sims, 
testified he was asked about his willingness to be bound 
by that 1932 Agreement, signed by hiln and his co-
plaintiffs and attempts were made to ask him about any 
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«·laim of fraud. On<'P again, his own counsel intervened 
and protP~h·<l that the plaintiff could not disclaim fraud 
t'VPn if he wantPd to as he was bound because his at-
torm•y said then• was fraud (R. 201). Apparently his 
attorney is the only one that knows of any semblance 
of fraud and was afraid to let his six clients approach 
the subjPet after their repeated declarations of love 
for their brother, George. This is a unique and wholly 
untenable position that a party cannot disclaim or with-
draw from the, apparently, unauthorized allegations of 
fraud made by his attorney. 
\\'hat is the rneasure of proof required of the plain-
tiffs on this fraud and undue influence issue~ The court 
at pre-trial (R. 99) said that such contentions must be 
~hown "hy clear ond convincing proof." The Amended 
Findings determined that the 1932 Agreement "is not 
void or unenforceable on the grounds of fraud, mistake 
or undue influence" (R. 111). 
One of the more recent cases from your court has 
held a~ to this issue that fraud must be pleaded and 
proreil aR to tlw basic elen1ents ; D u pl Pr v. Yates, 351 
I'.~d ()~-J., 10 rtah 2d 251. Those elements are spelled 
out in Parr Y. Parrish, 122 rtah 141, 247 P.2d 273 
as follows: 
(2) "This being an action in deceit based 
on fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden was 
upon plaintiffs to prove all of the essential ele-
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ments thereof. These are: (1) That a represen-
tation was made ; ( 2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; ( 3) which was false; ( 4) 
which the representor either (a) knew to be false, 
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had in-
sufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; ( 5) for the purpose of inducing 
the other party to act upon it; ( 6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was 
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage. See Stuck v. Delta Land & \Vater Co., 
63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791; Jones v. Pingree, 73, 
Utah 190, 273 P. 303; 23 An1. Jur. 773; 37 C.J.S., 
Fraud, Section 3, p. 215." 
That is the yardstick ''re apply to the various items 
in the findings and judgment of the trial court concern-
ing which issues are raised on this appeal." 
Now we know that the plaintiffs are going to claim 
that the "clear and convincing proof" level does not 
apply as they now assert some confidential relationship. 
We should examine that claim as relating to their April 
6, 1932 Agreement. Plaintiffs all testified that their 
father had just been buried that date and the family 
returned to the hon1e after the burial for food and to 
visit. George A. Sims, their oldest brother, invited them 
all to come into the fan1ily parlor, but to leave the in-
laws out. This was done and the Agreement was pre-
sented to the1n for reading and signing. Each ap-
proached this differently as is shown by their testimony. 
All had love for and confidence in George. All knew ·, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
that he had "run" the Salt Lake Transfer Company for 
~1'\'t-ral years, along with their brother .Milton K., while 
tlwi r father had gone on two missions for his Church 
nnd had been IP~~ active in his declining years. 
Two of the female plaintiffs testified that they were 
~till grief stricken and paid little attention to reading 
it. Obviously the 1nale plaintiffs read and understood 
it~ language. None of these were young children, the 
"girl~" wPre all mature, married women and the "boys" 
were businessmen. "Cleve" to whom they turned for 
counsel in signing, tells us that he had been an agent 
for New York Life Insurance Company for many years 
(R. 19~) and Louis K. testified that his experience with 
that company was even more extensive and that he had 
sold S,OOO policies, been in the first 10 highest agents in 
the l "!".::-;. for many years and was 73rd in the U.S. the 
preceding ~'ear (R. 210). 
\Yhat did Louis K. say about the fan1ily going into 
the room and excluding the in-laws when considering 
tlw Agreen1ent, ''perfectly proper" (R. 205). He said 
he was capable of reading the document and "I think I 
understood everything" ( R. 213). All of the plaintiffs 
professed great love for and confidence in George, then 
and now. Plaintiff Grace S. Malquist volunteered, 
"George has shown nothing but kindness and consider-
ation for all of us all of his life.'' 
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Now their counsel would twist this into something 
wicked and evil. Certainly they loved and trusted their 
brother, George. He has never betrayed this trust. He 
and Milton on that day, bought from them and the plain-
tiffs sold to the "present Salt Lake Transfer Company" 
the interests which the family had held for four days. 
The testimony was that their father's children "came 
along every two years" so that was no great difference 
in the ages of the parties. Three of the girls had their 
husbands in the next roon1. The fourth one, Irma, went 
back to Washington after the funeral and discussed the 
Agreement with her husband and "the finest attorney 
on the Coast" (R. 178). Not one of them has testified 
as to any false statement made by George, unless you 
consider the statement that he ·wanted the Agreement 
signed because he wanted to run the business, a false 
statement. None of the male plaintiffs contend that they 
were unable to know the tenns of the Agree1nent. 
At the ti1ne of trial, George was well over SO years 
of age and he was unable to recollect back to the 1932 
transactions as to details. Taking advantage of this, 
some of his younger brothers and sisters, the youngest 
being about 60 years of age, have tried to modify their 
Agreement by saying that they understood George to 
say he was going to run the business for them and they 
would be partners. This is directly opposite to the lan-
guage and intent of the Agremnent which was read and 
signed by them on April 6, 1932. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
Cmm~P l also desire to urge that smnething sinister 
1':\isted in the I' ad that 1\1 r. Irwin Clawson had pre-
pan·<l thP Agreement for Salt Lake Transfer Company 
and Ueorge had it there to be signed right after the 
funeral. (\,rtainly someone must prepare an Agree-
ment and ~omeone must present it for signatures. (The 
timing wa~ dictated hy the death of the father, April 3rd, 
the formation of a new partnership by George and Milt 
the next day and the fact that the rnajority of plaintiffs 
lin•d out of the state of Utah and were here only for 
the funeral.) Do plaintiffs contend that they would not 
hnvP signed it the next day or the next week or month? 
X o intimation of this is in the record. Louis K., who 
\\"a~ just a few )·ears younger than George and about 
-t! yPnJ·~ of age in 1932, testified that no one forced 
him to sign, in fact, "one one asked me." (R. 212). 
X o unfairness has been demonstrated by plaintiffs. 
In Perry Y. ;.l!cC'ollkic, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P.2d 852, 
tlw rule is announced that if because of friendship of the 
parties a fiduciary relationship exists, the fiduciary 
must show that the dealings were fair and in good faith. 
Yiewed in light of the Depression tirne, we see nothing 
unfair in the proposal rnade and accmnplished that day 
by the Agreen1ent. Plaintiffs for four days, by reason 
of their father's April 2d Bill of Sale, had owned a 
minority interest in partnership assets. 
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The two surviving partners bought and the plain-
tiffs sold such interests. ·The purchase price was to be 
set at the value as of the Bill of Sale date as prescribed 
by their father in that Bill of Sale which said, "tlw 
value of the same shall be appraised by Gladys S. Bul-
lough and George A. Sims and the figure set by these 
two shall be binding upon the withdrawing Grantee." 
(Exhibit P-A). There was nothing unfair in that. 
Gladys is one of the plaintiffs and George is a defend-
ant. Each side was to be represented so no unfairness 
of price could be asserted. 
As the money ·was not available then to pay the 
purchase price to plaintiffs as ''-withdrawing Grantees," 
1/27th of the net profits was to be paid by way of inter-
est until the purchase price was paid. Actually this has 
been a suin far in excess of nonnal interest, so no unfair 
advantage of plaintiffs has been taken there. George 
and Milton K. agreed with plaintiffs to a monthly salary 
of $200.00 each. This level of compensation has been 
followed faithfully by then1 for 27 years until the death 
of Milton K. and up to trial as to GeorgP. 
In conclusion of this phase, we desire to emphasize 
that there was no pleading of fraud, etc., but only a 
"contention" of plaintiffs' attorneys, there was no proof 
of fraud, there was no fiduciary relationship, there was 
no unfairness in the Agreement. Had any plaintiff 
thought otherwise, he or she could have asked for their 
Inoney at any time bPtween 1932 and 1960, but none did. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 'THE PURCH-
ASE PRICE VALUATION AS OF JUNE 3, 1960 AND PAR-
TICULARLY ERRED IN IGNORING THE V ALU~T'ION SET 
IN 1947 BY THOSE DESIGNATED IN THE 1932 BILL OF 
SALE AND AGREEMENT. 
The second phase of this case was a separate trial 
to determine the valuation of the interests sold by plain-
tiffs to defendants in 1932. The Court had already en-
tered it~ Findings and Judgn1ent (R. 109-115) that the 
.\gn·Pnwnt wa~ valid and enforceable. However, the 
('ourt determined that the sale price was not to be 
fixPd until tlw date of a demand for pay1nent by plain-
ti rr~, which was June 3, 1960, the date of filing this 
action. 
Throughout the 28 years, defendants have known 
that some day they must pay the purchase price and 
until then interest at the rate of 1/27th of the net profits 
must be paid to each defendant. The books and records 
rdlt•d annual and often Inore frequent interest remit-
taneP~. The plaintiffs were referred to as "Creditors 
of :Salt Lake Transfer Company (Exhibit D-F in the 
statements sent out annually. 
Defendants have at all times contended that the 
valuation as of 1932 was the purchase price set by the 
Agreement because that is when plaintiffs ·withdrew as 
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contemplated by the father's Bill of Sale. After the 
War, G. Grant Sims, son of George A., returned to Utah 
and considered leaving his position in the East and buy-
ing into Salt Lake Transfer Company by purchase of 
a part of his father's half interest. At that time a review 
of the Agreement and Bill of Sale were had and th(-•y 
sought to tie down this 1932 purchase price to a fixed 
figure so he would know what he was buying from his 
father. 
The language requ1nng valuation by Gladys S. 
Bullough and George A. Silns was noted. This was 
not optional but was required by the father's Bill of 
Sale and the plaintiffs by their Agreement "approve of 
such Bill of Sale and of the method therein set for 
valuing the share owned by George H. Sims at the 
time of the execution of such Bill of Sale." (Exhibit 
P-A and P-B). 
Thus, ·with the method of valuing being fixed and 
the time of valuing set, ~teps were taken in 1947 to have 
the two designated by their father and approved by the 
plaintiffs to set all the 19,32 value. Exhibit D-H and 
D-I are the result of this request. Exhibit D-I is a re-
constructed Balance Sheet at April 2, 1932. Plaintiff 
Gladys S. Bullough signed this along with George A. 
Prior to signing this, her husband, David H. Bul-
lough went to the office of Salt Lake Transfer Com-
pany and checked and YPrified this statement. He was 
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tlw accountant who had maintained the company books 
prior to 1930 and continuously until called into military 
:-;l'!'vi<'P in 1940. Thus he was thoroughly familiar with 
t hP hook~ and rPrords. In 194 7 he had returned home 
a ~I ajor, was in an independent business and in no way 
under any compulsion from or obligation to Salt Lake 
Transfer Company to verify the figures. 
U lady~ tPstified that she knew of her husband's 
familiarity with the 1932 books and reeords of Salt 
Lake Transfer Company and she relied upon his repre-
~wntations to her and his investigation of the values 
when ~:'he signed the valuations in 1947 (R. 231, 235-36). 
Exhibit D-I is the actual balance sheet as of April 2, 
1932 and Exhibit D-ll is a ~~ emorandum which recites 
the Bill of Sale, the Agree1nent and that Gladys and 
Ueorge had investigated the values and had reached 
an agreement as to the same and then established such 
at $3,614.41 for each share owned by the plaintiffs. 
This was signed by them and witnessed by her hus-
band, David H. Bullough. If nothing else, this valuation 
hy Jl r8. Bullough of her interest and the similar inter-
P~t~ of the other plaintiffs is a binding admission against 
interest. .. A declaration by an owner of property stat-
ing the value thereof is admissible where value is an 
i~:-:nP ... ~0 Am . .J 11 r. -~90. 
Should she be allowed to renege from this~ We 
think not. Should the other five plaintiffs be allowed 
to ignore the n1ethod of valuation prescribed by their 
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father in his Bill of Sale to them and adopted by them? 
We think not. This method of valuation is akin to a 
condition precedent which adheres to the claim of each 
plaintiff as it is part and parcel of the Bill of Sale by 
which their only interests came to them and reposed in 
them for four days. 
Mr. Bullough acknowledged that he was very fa-
miliar with the Salt Lake 'Transfer Company and its 
books and that in 1947 and before his wife signed the 
Balance Sheet and Memorandum he verified the figures 
with Mr. Grant Gay and Mr. Elmer L. Sims at the 
company office ( R. 243). He then testified that he ad-
vised his wife to sign the Balance Sheet and the l\Iem-
orandum (R. 246). His testimony is confirmed by his 
wife and by Mr. Grant Sims who told of l\fr. Bullough 
checking the audit, discussing the details and the sign-
ing (R. 256-259). The fact that the valuation as of 
April 19,32 was made in 1947 instead of 1960 should 
make no difference as the 1932 value was clearly as-
certainable from the books and records. The element 
of good will was not included in Exhibit D-I, the Bal-
ance Sheet, as Mr. Bullough testified that "no great 
value was left on the intangibles." (R. 246). On this 
phase, the record shows that said date preceded any 
issuance of certificates or permits by the State of Utah 
or the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
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The trial Court therefore should have awarded 
judgnwnt to the plaintiffs for the sum thus set by the 
<lP~i~mttPd individuals plus any unpaid interest. No 
di~pntP has PVPr existed as to the unpaid interest, in 
l'ad, that suin has now been fully paid to plaintiffs. The 
trial court erred in valuing the assets sold in 1932 at 
tlwi r 1960 figure. The inconsistency of this position is 
demonstrated by the fact that though all six sold and 
convPyPd their interests in 1932 and agreed to have 
their brother and sister value such as of the 1932 Bill 
of ~ale, ~-d, if the Court were right, any one of the 
plaintiffs could have demanded their money at differ-
l'nt times and each would receive a different purchase 
prieP for the smne undivided interest. Such was not the 
intent of the Bill of Sale or Agreement. 
POINT VII 
THE OOURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE 
VALUATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
IN 1959 FOLLOWING DE,A'TH OF D. K. SIMS. 
\Yithout admitting the propriety of valuing the 
193~ interest at a later date, ·we urge that the Court 
should weigh as persuasive evidence the uncompleted 
transaction wherein following the demise of Milton K. 
~im~, George A .. offered to plaintiffs $18,000.00 each 
(this included the lmpaid interest) and the plaintiffs 
agreed such to be reasonable valuation and fair and 
accepted the offer ( R. 187). This offer of plaintiffs 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
to effectuate a settlement at a certain price is admis-
sible evidence against them as an admission in fixing 
the value at or near the time when the offer was made. 
( 20 Am. J ur 491 and citations.) Another contempor-
aneous valuation was the sale and purchase of the same 
fractional interest made by plaintiffs' brother, John, 
in 1960 for $10,000.00 (representing the 19'32 value plus 
accrued interest). ·This was an arms length transaction 
between two businessmen (R. 769). Such is the only 
contemporaneous settlement actually completed on the 
identical interests owned by each of the plaintiffs. By 
referring to this as a settlement, we do so only on the 
assumption that the unvalued goodwill omitted from 
the 1932 Balance Sheet might possibly have some minor 
worth which would account for the difference between 
the $8500.00 principal and inter<->st and the $10,000.00 
paid. 
POINT VIII 
ASSUMING A 1960 PURCHASE PRICE VALUATION, 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
AS IT USED A SALVAGE VALUE BASIS WITHOUT ANY 
ALLOWANCE FOR LIQUIDATION OR SALVAGE EXPENSE. 
At the trial of the second phase of the case, evidence 
of accountants and appraisers was taken in pursuance 
of the Court's earlier order, and the Court took evidence 
from plaintiffs ·witnesses on the June 1960 valuation of 
thP Salt Lake Transfer assets. Sin1s Realty, Inc. is a 
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corporation to which the partners had conveyed the 
n·nlty owned and used by Salt Lake Transfer Com-
pany, hence, it was stipulated that if a 1960 valuation 
WPI'P to hP used by the Court, the assets of Sims Realty 
should hP included. By inadvertence, references are 
made to June 30 in the evidence rather than June 3, 
1960 the actual date of filing the complaint by plaintiffs 
in this case. 
\V e shall reVIew the various bases for valuation 
which were placed in evidence. There are four possible 
approaches for the Court to take in determining the 
amount due to the plaintiffs in this case. These are as 
follow~: 
A. Yaluation as of April 1932, plus accumulated 
unpaid net earnings since that date in lieu of 
interest. 
B. Y aluation as a going concern as of June 3, 
1960. 
C. Salvage value as of June 3, 1960. 
D. Yaluation based on contemporary "sale" or on 
ta..""< valuation. 
~-\.. raluation as of April 6, 1932. 
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In its Order of May 3, 1962, the Court rejected the 
contention of the defendants that the amount which 
should be recovered by the plaintiffs is the agreed valu-
ation as of April 6, 1932, plus their undrawn share of 
the earnings since that date. This ruling, howevPr, is 
still subject to revision. After tlw defendants paid to 
the plaintiffs $48,000.00 to apply on the ultirnate judg-
rnent in this case, an interim appeal was taken to the 
Supreme Court. The defendants resisted the appeal on 
the grounds that there was no final or appealable 
judgment. Apparently the Supreme Court agreed with 
this position, because it declined to entertain the appeal. 
Without wanting to unduly labor this mattvr, we 
wish to point out that the Court has found that the 
plaintiffs are creditors and not partners. That being 
so, it appears that their values should lw fixed as of 
the tirne they became creditors. A creditor's position 
of debt-claim does not grow as to the principal, but only 
by interest accurnulations. In this case, as the Court 
has found that the plaintiffs are entitled to earnings 
in lieu of interest, the position that should be taken ap-
pears clear. The plaintiffs are entitled to their value 
of the property as of April 6, 1932, plus accumulated 
but undrawn earnings since that date. 
B. l' aluations as a Goillg CoJiccrn. 
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Plaintiffs prP~Pnted no evidence to the court as 
to the valuation of Salt Lake Transfer or Sims Realty 
Company on a g-oing concern basis. The sole evidence 
in thi~ regard can1e from Professor Frank Stuart of 
the Univt>r~ity of Utah, Business Research Bureau (R. 
li~:q. BPeau~P Salt Lake Transfer and Sims Realty in 
et'ft>et form one composite operating unit, Professor 
Htuart arrived at a valnP of both companies as a 
~ingle unit and as a going concern, based upon the 
rapitalization of their earnings. As Professor Stuart 
tt~~tified, this is what the property in question is worth 
a~ a business which is not to be broken up into its com-
positP parts but sold as a business which is going to 
rontinue in operation and which is going to continue to 
NUn a return for the owners. It was Professor Stuart's 
opinion, based upon this approach, that the two com-
paniP~ combined were worth approximately $135,000.00 
(R. u~7-629). The plaintiffs, therefore, under this ap-
proach should each be entitled to recover 6o/3 of the 
$1:~5,000.00, plus, of course, their accu1nulated and un-
drawn earnings. The sum to which this would amount 
will be summarized later in the appendix to this brief. 
l'. Salragr ralue. 
It was stated by Professor Stuart on cross-examina-
tion, and indeed it can be concluded by the Court in 
tlw ahsencP of such a statement, that there are tin1es 
when tlw cmnposite value of the assets of a cmnpany, 
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less its liabilities, are worth more than the company 
value as a going concern. In such a case two things are 
evident - ( 1) the owners of the company would be bettPr 
off if it ceased to do business and proceeded to liquidate 
the assets and invest the money in another enterprise; 
and (2) the intangibles of the firm, i.e., goodwill, oper-
ating rights, etc., have no value at all. 
One thing, however, should he borne in mind, and 
that is that the salvage value of a firm is not arrived 
at merely by valuing the individual 1naterial assets and 
deducting therefrom the liabilities, because this ignore~ 
entirely the question of the cost of salvaging a firm, 
\vhich may be much or little, depending upon the nature 
of a firm. We do not wish to imply to the Court that 
it would take overly long or would be unduly expensive 
to liquidate the Salt Lake TransfPr and Sims Realty 
assets. However, it cannot be doubted that considerable 
time and considerable expense would be entailed in such 
a proceeding, and if this Court is to take the position 
that this cmnpany is nwre valuable for salvage than 
as a going concern and proceed to value it on that 
basis, then due consideration Inust be given to the cost 
of salvaging. The salvage and other values considered 
by the trial Court are : 
1. ROLLING STOCK 
There is a great variance between the parties in 
regard to the evaluation of the rolling stock of Salt 
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LakP Tran~t'Pr Con1pany. Plaintiffs called a l\Ir. Phillips 
1 I:. :~S~) and It rl-W), who valued the trucks and tractors 
at $1:-ll.IOO.OO, and a .Jir. Paramore (R. 425), who valued 
t hP t railPrs at $102,750.00. ~I r. Grant Sims valued trucks, 
t rad or~ and trailers all together at a total of $122,996.77. 
'fhe Court'~ ~I <>morandum set such at $175,000.00. 
All of thP~P witnesses were working with the same 
list of equipment and all of their appraisals were based 
upon the same original costs, as these were taken from 
the books and records of the company. The difference 
in their appraisals appears to result from the difference 
in depreciation adopted hy the various appraisers. Plain-
tiffs applied to the new price of the equipment the de-
ln·eciation schedule set forth in Exhibit P-10, whereas 
the defendants applied the schedule reflected in Exhibit 
D-:!7 (R. 7-tH). 
It cannot be doubted that, except for such bias as 
rP~nlt from his being a party to the suit, Mr. Grant 
~im~ is the best qualified of any of the appraisers so 
far as rolling stock is concerned. His long experience 
in this field, both with Salt Lake Transfer and with 
Burlington Transportation Cmnpany (R. 7 45), has 
qualified him uniquely to appraise accurately the valu-
ation of tractors, trucks and trailers. In view of the 
well n•cognized tendency of "impartial" expert apprais-
t·rs to color their appraisals to suit the interests of the 
partit>~ by whmn they are hired, the relative accuracy 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
58 
of Exhibits P-10 and D-27 should be weighted by evi-
dence in the case other than the ability or self-intere~ts 
of the various experts. 
This Court can take judicial notice that the rat<• 
of depreciation tends to decline rather than increase 
as the equipment gets older. The most damning refu-
tation of Mr. Phillips figures, however, came from his 
own lips. He stated that in arriving at his valuation 
he had used as an aid the Truck Blue Book, which on 
the first day of his testimony he did not haYe in Court 
with him. After a day's recess he got this book, however, 
and counsel cross-examined him in regard to the valu-
ation shown by the Blue Book, and particularly in regard 
to the rate of depreciation as established hy tlw Bhw 
Book when applied to like equipment of varying ages. 
By taking a typical piece of equip1nent through a seven-
year period to the age of seven years, the greatest age 
indicated in the Blue Book, and cmnparing the values in 
each year, it becan1e apparent that his Exhibit P-10 
was valueless. 
The plaintiffs did considerable pious breast-beating 
in regard to the valuation of the rolling stock by show-
ing in the case of son1e of the nt>wer equip1nent it 
actually valued it higher than the Blue Book figure. 
This means little, however, as there were only a very 
few pieces of eqnip1nent in that category. The great 
bulk of the Salt Lake Transfer rolling stock was in the 
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catPg-ory wlwn· :Mr. Phillips' appraisal "·as grossly in-
flated IH·<·an~P of the understat<'ment of depreciation 
t-stabli~lw<l frmn his own lips. Exhibit D-28 prepared 
under t lw direction of l\lr. Ebner Sims applies to the 
purrha~l' pri<'<' of P:.wh pi<'CP of t~quip1nent the depreci-
ation ratP tP~t ified to hy .JI r. Grant Sims, the depreci-
ation rah• rPj<'eh•<l h~· ~I r. Phillips, hut substantiated by 
Jl r. Phillip~· own testimony. 
:\lr. Parimore's Pxhibit valuing the trailers, Exhibit 
I,-~, turned out to be one of the most carelessly pre-
parPd docmnent~ that can be ilnagined. As pointed out 
hy j( r. Grant Sims in his testinwny, l\lr. Pari1nore in 
l·:xhihit P--t. valued quit<' a nu1nber of the used pieces 
ot' Pquipment at a price actually above their purchase 
prirP. The most unusual thing he did, however, was to 
plarP different valuations, in a number of instances, 
on identical eqnip1nent. If 1Ir. Parimore had actually 
:-;l•t~n the equipment as of the date his appraisal was 
eft'l·l'tiYt>, such a difference in th<-_. apparisal as to identi-
<•al t•quipment 1night well be explained on a difference 
in condition. It 1nust be reme1nbered, however, that 
:\lr. Parimore did not see the equipment at the time. 
He h'~tifiPd, as did both ~Ir. Si1ns and l\Ir. Phillips, that 
in valuing the equipn1ent some 21j2 years after the ef-
ft'rtiYe date of his valuation, he had to assume average 
rondition for each piece of equipment. I low do you ex-
plain varying valuation on identical equipment ·when 
you are assuming identical condition? The onl~- answer 
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is that Exhibit A-4 was hurriedly and carelessly pre-
pared in an effort to build up valuation and not to 
arrive at accurate valuations. 
The defendants submit, therefore, that the valuation 
on the rolling stock as established by :Mr. Grant Sims 
in the amount of $122,996.77 should be accepted by this 
Court as being accurate rather than tlw $175,000.00 
found by the trial Court. 
2. SIMS REALTY, 1XC. 
The plaintiffs in their Brief 1nake much of the 
fact that the defendants did not call an independent 
realtor for the purpose of appraising the four parcels 
of real property which 1nake up the great bulk of the 
assets of the Sims Realty Company. The defendants did 
not call a realtor because of the feeling of counsel that 
a fair valuation of these tracts of realty can be obtained 
from Exhibit P-5, introduced by the plaintiff's witness 
Cook. 
We are not in agreen1ent with the conclusions ad-
vanced by Mr. Cook, but it appears that from an 
examination of P-5 any person, whether realtor or not, 
can obtain sufficient basic data on which to arrive at 
a fair valuation of these properties. This data, when 
properly analyzed, leads to the conclusion that the ap-
praisal of 1\ir. Grant Silns, placing the value of this 
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pro{H'rty at IH'tW<'<'n $75,000.00 and $100,000.00, is very 
nt>ar to accurate, and that the appraisal of the $152,100.00 
n·tHlrtl•d h~· ~I r. Cook and Mr. Johns is patently ex-
horitant. 
Exhibit P-5 lists the four tracts of real property as 
Pan·<'b A, B, C and D. For purposes of discussion here, 
Wl' will list the1n similarly. 
Pa reel A: ·This parcel is located on the north side 
of -H h South Street, a little west of midway between Main 
and \YP~t Temple Streets. It has a frontage of 66· feet 
and an area of 10,890 square feet. On the property is 
lorated a building which is without value. In fact, Cook 
and .I ohns in their analysis reached the conclusion that 
the presence of the building, rather than enhancing the 
value of the land, actually detracts from it by $5,000.00. 
In arriving at their valuation of $55,000.00, Cook and 
.I ohns assmned a valuation of $5.50 per square foot 
for a total of $59,896.00, less $5,000.00 for demolition 
of the existing building. They ignored the matter of 
frontal footage. However, the valuation they have placed 
worked out to a figure of $833.00 per frontal foot. 
The market cmnparison price which they have at-
tached to their exhibit, however, shows that the highest 
price paid for land in that vicinity ·was the Newhouse 
Realty property, which sold in 1961 for $767 per frontal 
foot and $-1.93 per square foot. This court, from its 
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knowledge of the area in question, however, can take 
notice that the Newhouse Realty property is of consider-
ably more value on a frontal footage basis or on a 
square footage basis than is the Sims property. To 
begin with, the Sims property has a small frontage and 
considerable depth, and has no access fron1 any direc-
tion except from 4th South Street. The Newhouse Realty 
property on the other hand is bounded by city streets on 
three sides and appears to be one of the 1nost desirable 
pieces of property in this section of town. Averaging 
the two comparable sale figures out to give effect both 
to square footage and frontal footage, we arrive at a 
valuation on the real property of $33,957, assuming it 
was not encumbered by a worthless building. Deducting 
Cook and John's estimate for demolition in the amount 
of $5,000.00 we arrive at a valuation on this property 
of $28,957. This seems consistent with the purchase price 
paid by Sims Realty. ·This property ·was purchased in 
19·38 for a total purchase price of $18,238.7 +. During the 
ensuing 22 years, undoubtedly the real property in-
creased considerably in value. At the same time, how-
ever, the building depreciated. The figure of $28,957 
for Parcel A, therefore, appears to be well supported 
by the basic data in Exhibit P-:J. 
Parcel B: Parcel B is on the X orth side of 2nd South 
street almost to 1st "\Vest street. It has a frontage of 
50 feet and a depth of 120 feet, and contains 6,000 square 
feet. Cook and .Johns arriye at a value of $24,000 for 
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tlti:-; propPrty on t1H· basis of a valuation of $4.00 per 
~~1nare foot. TlH·y ignore entirPI~· the frontal footage 
npproaeh to ya]uation. They arrive at a value of the 
improYt'lll<'nt~ on that land at a figure of $9,513. 
Rt>f'PITing to their market c01nparison sheet, how-
t'YPI', the only c01nparable sale in recent years is that 
ot' tlw trad of the Greek Orthodox Church, only a block 
and a half mn1.y on a nn1eh more highly travelled street. 
Tlw pri<·P paid for the Greek Orthodox Church property 
wn~ *:m:2 pt>r frontal foot and $1.83 per square foot . 
.Applying thP~<' yaluations to the Sims Realty property, 
we would arrive at a value of $15,100 on a frontal footage 
hn:-;i:-; and $10,980 on a squarP footage basis. Taking an 
nvt•ragP of the~<' two to give effect to both, a valuation 
of $1 :~.0:20 is arrived at for the real property. This land 
wn~ pureha~t>d in 1937 by Sims Realty C01npany for 
$l,{i;lO. l\•rtainly it has not increased in value more than 
~ tinw~ during the intervening yPars. 
ln 1937 Sin1s RPalty Company paid $4,600 for the 
huilding. \Yhile it has been n1odernized slightly since 
that tinw, it has also been subject to nonnal depreciation. 
There appears to be no 1nore reason for assigning to 
tlw building today a greater value than it had when 
pnrl'ha~Pcl. Adding these figures together, it appears 
from Exhibit P -5 that fair Yaluation of Parcel B would 
be $17.ti:20. 
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Parcel C: Parcel C is an unimproved tract of land 
at 5th West and South ·Temple Streets, used by the 
company for open storage of mobile equipment. The 
company acquired this tract in six different parcels 
between 1932 and 1956 at a total cost of $18,253.26. The 
tract contains 153,164 square feet. Cook and Johns used 
a valuation of 35¢ per square foot in arriving at a valu-
ation of $5·3,600, to which they added $1,400 for fencing. 
An examination of comparable sales in the vicinity, 
however, indicates that a similar piece of property pur-
chased by Hawa in December of 1961 ran only 27¢ per 
foot. The Hawa property is located only a block from 
the Sims Realty property. While it may be possible that 
the property might bring more than 27¢ a foot if held 
for a long period, in all probability on a reasonably 
quick sale it would bring somewhat less, probably not 
more than the 26¢ per square foot paid by the Overland 
Moving Company for similar property on 4th \Vest and 
South Ten1ple, less than a block fron1 the subject prop-
erty. Applying a valuation of 26¢ per square foot to 
the Sims Realty property, we arriYe at a valuation of 
$39,822.64. This is more than twice what the company 
paid for the property, smne of it purchased as recently 
as four years before the valuation date. Adding to the 
bare value of the property the value of fencing, it 
appears that a fair valuation on Parcel {~ is $41,220.6-±. 
Parcel D: Parcel D is a s1nall tract having a 66 foot 
frontage and 165 foot depth, located at 130 South 5th 
West. A small building used for storage is located on 
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the propPrty. Cook and Johns valued the real estate 
at $90.00 pPr frontal foot or 50¢ per square foot, which 
yiPl<l~ a yaluation of $6,000. Their schedule of compar-
ahiP ~alP~. howPv<'r, fails to bear this out. The nearest 
<·omparahle ~ale to this property is shown as iten1 3 
on th(:1ir ~[arkt't Comparison Chart, which is a tract of 
land only one block from that which was purchased in 
19(il hy Hawa. The price paid by Hawa was $45.00 a 
frontal foot or 27¢ a square foot. Applying these valu-
ations to thP ~ims HPalty property, we arrive at a valu-
ation of $2,970 on a frontal basis and $2,940 on a square 
rootagt> Jm~i~. This prO}H'l'ty was purchased by Sims 
in 19-il for a total price of $3,825.61, which was divided 
on the books a~ $485.85 for land and $3,339.76 for build-
ing~ .. \~suming thP buildings are still worth what they 
Wt're originally, as appears logical, depreciation off-
~t'tting appreciation in value, a fair valuation on Tract 
D i~ $6,309. 
If ~alvagP value is adopted by this Court, then it 
appear~ that a fair valuation of the Sims Realty prop-
t•rtit·~ is $94,106, less a reasonable charge for selling 
commissions in the a1nount of approximately $5,000, or 
a net that should he charged to these defendants of 
$S9,000. This figure is ·within the price range testified 
tn by ~Ir. Grant Sin1s. The trial Court's finding of 
$105,000.00 i~ too high for the facts. 
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3. NON-TANGIBLE ASSE·TS 
In attempting to arrive at a valuation on a salvage 
basis, the most difficult things to value, of course, are 
the intangibles, including the franchises, permits and 
good will. A general test adopted for valuation of in-
tangibles belonging to a company is the earnings of 
the company over and above a reasonable return on the 
investment in tangible assets. For example, if the in-
vestment in tangible assets is $200,000 over and above 
liabilities, and a reasonable return on the type of busi-
ness, considering its hazards and uncertainties, is 8%, 
the value of the intangibles would be determined by 
capitalizing the average yearly earnings over and above 
$16,000. On the other hand, if the con1pany is not earn-
ing a reasonable return on its tangible assets, its in-
tangibles are worth nothing. It follov{s, therefore, as 
testified to by Professor Stuart, that when a company 
is worth n1ore for salvage of its tangibles than it is 
as a going concern, its intangibles are without value. 
Therefore, if the plaintiffs are going to 1naintain for a 
valuation on the tangible assets over and above liabili-
ties more than the $135,000 which Professor Stuart testi-
fied was the value of the cmnpany as a going concern, 
then no value should be assigned to the intangibles, 
and certainly no value can be assigned to that ethereal 
thing called good will. 
Operating rights are worth only what they will 
earn. While there may he some 1narket for operating 
rights by a cmnpetitor such as :JI r. Seifers, who wishes 
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to gt·t rid of his cmnpetition, this does not appear to be 
n \\"Pll Piwngh establi~lu·d or stable enough market upon 
which to pn·di<'at<> any valuation. It is conceded by the 
plaintiffs that "the valuation of the intangibles of Salt 
1 ~nkt> Tr:.m~fpr Co., that is, the franchises, cerificates, 
O[H'rating right~ and good will, is a difficult task," and 
a.!.!;ain "it is unlikely, perhaps impossible, to find a situ-
ation whPn' operating rights are precisely the same from 
t·ompany to company." This is certainly borne out by 
tht> t t'st i tnon~, of l\1r. Seifers. His basis for valuation 
of operating rights is 1nade from a background of the 
opPration of a highly successful company - a con1pany 
which lta~ Pxtensive regular route interstate transconti-
twntnl o1wrating rights which have yielded excellent op-
erating ratios.* On the other hand, Salt Lake Transfer's 
operating rights are, for the most part, in a field where 
thP competition i~ heavy and where the return is rela-
tiYt·l~· bad. On cro~s-Pxmnination, Mr. Seifers stated 
that tlw operating ratio of Interstate l\fotor Lines, with 
which he is comwcted, varied from 85 to 88. On the 
ntht•r hand, the operating ratio of Salt Lake Transfer, 
at>cording to the tPstimony of ~Ir. Gay, has not dropped 
lwlow !l:l, and in 1960 was actually above 100. This court 
ean takP judicial notice that the Public Service Conl-
mission of rtah has held that an operating ratio of frmn 
!lO to D:2 is within a safe range. An operating ratio of 
*Operating ratio is the test generally used by regulatory commissions 
to determine the adequacy of the earnings of motor transport com-
~es. Simply stated, the operating ratio is the percentage relation-
ship which operating expenses bear to operating revenues before the 
application of any income tax. 
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below 90 is that of an extraordinarily successful com-
pany, while a company operating at an operating ratio 
of above 92 is in some danger, the danger increasing, 
of course, the higher the operating ratio rises. 
It is likewise apparent that the testimony of Mr. 
Utzinger in this case cannot be given very great crPd-
ence. Mr. Utzinger testified that his company was op-
erating at a loss at the time he sold his operating rights 
for substantial sums. Anyone hearing this might well 
ask just why would anybody pay anything for operating 
rights which were losing 1noney. Only one of two an-
swers is available. Either the prospective purchasers 
decided that Mr. Utzinger's operating loss resulted from 
poor management and that his rights with proper man-
agement could yield a reasonable rate of return on the 
amount paid, or there might be a case where there was 
a purchaser who was already operating and who hap-
pened to need the particular rights which Jlr. rtzinger 
offered for sale in order to supple1nent certain rights 
which the purchaser already had. X o other explanations 
are available. Is either of these bases sufficient, how-
ever, to establish a market value on other and different 
rights 1 There is no factor in this case which would 
indicate that the rights of Salt Lake Transfer Company 
would yield a greater return under different manage-
Inent. Furthermore, it appears that the rights which 
Salt Lake Transfer has are rights which are subject to 
a great deal of cmnpetition frmn like operating rights 
held b~v competing companie~. It is highly speculative 
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whether any competing cmnpany could be found which 
would have operating rights which would need supple-
uwnting hy the particular rights which Salt Lake Trans-
fer might havP for sale. 
rro attempt to place any substantial value on any 
rights owned by Salt Lake Transfer would be specula-
tin• in the extreme. The fact that 1\Ir. Elmer Sims 
tt-~ti t'iPd that he would not sell the operating rights for 
$~SO,OOO, for to do so would put hirn out of a job and 
rt•nder hb tangible assets valueless, has no effect here. 
l~uitP ohYiou~l~·, tla•y would be very foolish to sell the 
operating rights unless they were taken along with a 
p~wkagP deal for the entire company, as to do so would 
mPrt>ly h•nYP them with certain anitquated assets of 
doubtful value on their hands and no way to use them. 
Even the valuation of $50,000 put on the operating 
right8 hy :\f r. Elnwr Sims and Mr. Grant Sims is obvi-
on8ly no more than an educated guess, but represents 
l'Prtainly the 1naxirnum that this court should accept 
if it proceeds with valuation on a salvage basis. The 
nnly l'08t basis of tlwse operating rights is the sum of 
$3,000 paid to Hadley ·Transfer for the general con1-
modity authority purchased by S. L. Transfer. The 
trial l'ourt's valuation at $150,000.00 appears to he a 
l'l)lll}H'OllliSL' figure. 
D. raluat ions by Cornpa raule Sales and Tax Ap-
praisals 
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There are two "purchase and sale" agreements of 
interest in the combined Salt Lake Transfer-Sims Realty 
operation which should be taken into consideration by 
hte court in fixing a valuation: 
1. The John Sims Transaction : 
The most recent of these was the settlement of an 
interest identical to that held by these plaintiffs by Mr. 
John Sims to his brother, George A. Si1ns, in 1959. In-
deed this appears to be the most persuasiYe evidence 
in the entire case as to the amount which should be paid 
to the plaintiffs. It should be borne in mind that GeorgP 
A. Sims acquired from John Sims not just John Sims' 
claim on the business, but also his porportionate share 
of the accumulated and undistributed earnings. This 
was an arms-length transaction arrived at by a knowl-
edgable and discriminating seller with a knowledgable 
and discri1ninating buyer, where neither was under any 
compulsion to complete the transaction. John Sims was 
no neophyte in the business world. The evidence is that 
he was a successful automobile dealer in San Bernardino, 
Calif. (R. 760), and therefore had knowledge not only 
of business, but to some extent of automotive values. 
lie voluntarily transferred his interest, identical with 
these six plaintiffs, within one year of the time used 
as the valuation date in this case, for the sum of $10,000. 
\ V e should also be mindful that George A. Si1ns is one 
of the two designated by the father in 19:i2 to make 
a valuation of the assetf'. 
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., ThP Elmer Sims PurchasP: 
In .Jan nary of 1953, Ebner Sims purchased from his 
fntlwr. ~I ilton l{. Sim~. a 1j20th interest in the partner-
~hip for thP smn of $14,000, which would indicate a value 
on the whole of $280,000. (R. 691) Two factors must be 
tnkPn into considPration, howevPr, in evaluating this sale. 
ThP fir~t b that it was made right near the conclusion 
of the KorPan "Tar, when Salt Lake Transfer Company, 
nlong with nParly every common carrier in the country, 
h:Hl PXpPriPnced a period of unparalleled prosperity. The 
('ompany'~ nPt Parnings for several years had equalled 
or PXCPPded $50,000. On the other hand, we are attempt-
ing to value this property as of 1960, at which time the 
<·ompany during the four preceding years had averaged 
h·~~ than $20,000 per year net profit, and at which time 
the eompany during the year 1960 was actually in a net 
I«)~~ situation. 
ThP second factor which must be subject to adjust-
nwnt if the Elmer Silns purchase is to be used as a basis 
for valuation, is the fact that Elmer was purchasing not 
only a portion of his father's interest in the partnership 
a~~ .. t~. but also a portion of his father's interest in the 
:weumulated but undistributed earnings w·hich everyone 
agTPP~. in reaching a valuation in this case, we must treat 
~t'paratPly as a liability of the company before reaching 
n 1wt valuation. 
:~. The Inheritance Tax Appraisal: 
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The plaintiffs placed in evidence during the trial of 
the case the inheritance tax appraisal on the estate of 
Milton K. Sims, which included a 30o/a interest in both 
Salt Lake Transfer and Sims Realty. Expanding this 
30% interest as set forth in the inheritance tax appraisal 
to 100%, we would arrive at a total valuation on the 
two companies of $365,000. Two matters must be taken 
into consideration, however, in using this figure as a 
valuation factor. The first of these is that appraisal 
was not made by Mr. Sims at all, but was made by inheri-
tance tax appraisers of the State of Utah, who were not 
present in this case for cross-examination. As such, it 
is highly improbable that this was competent evidence 
at all, and if it was held to be cmnpetent in view of the 
absence of opportunity for cross-examination, it should 
be given very little weight. 
The second factor which must be taken into con-
sideration in regard to these fiigures is that they valued 
not only Milton K. Sims 30% interest in the company 
assets as a going concern, but also his 30% interest in 
the accumulated but undrawn earnings of the Salt Lake 
Transfer Cmnpany, which everyone in this case agrees 
must be eliminated from consideration, or, in other words, 
treated as a liability in arriving at a valuation for pur-
poses of this ease. 
CONCLUSION 
,The 1932 Agree1nent of the plaintiffs n1ade a sale 
then and there to the new Salt Lake Transfer Company. 
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llt·ferment of paynwnt of the purchase price and interest 
thereon waH an n<·<·<·ph·d incident of a Depression sale. 
'rhPir heloved hrother, George acted in good faith and 
mu~t not IJP penalized now because he let the plaintiffs 
J'4'('t>iVP their favorable interest payments for a long time 
and did not elmw the1n out the first opportunity when 
monPy waH nYailablP. 
\YP urge the Court to reverse the findings and judg-
nwnt of the trial Court that these interests, sold and 
hong-ht in 1932, are to be valued as of 1960. Should the 
( •ourt disagree with that position, we urge that the valu-
ation finally fixed be reduced to conform with the con-
h•mporaneous values set by plaintiffs or at least upon a 
~nlvag-P hasis and that it be returned to the Court to take 
(ividenee as to the necessary costs and expenses of such 
liquidation and salvage. 
X o hardship will result to plaintiffs by providing 
them with payment for the value of their interests as 
of tht:> date of their sale in 1932. Their 28 years of 
nequiescence in the debtor-creditor relationship should 
foreclose this belated effort to have the court made a new 
and different contract from that expressed by their 1932 
.\greement. 
Respectfully submitted: 
PrGSLEY HAYES, RAniPTON & 
'VATKISS 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
CAL YI~ L. RAl\IPTON 
AttnrnP,lJS for defPndrmts. 
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APPEXDIX ON YALrATIONS 
The result of the various bases of valuation con-
tPnd.-d for hy the parties in this case may be summarized 
ns follows: 
A. \'aluation as of April 6, 1932: 
.Appraised valuation of assets by 
~Irs. Bullough and Mrs. Sims as of 
April 6, 1932 ------------------------------------------$ 21,686.46 
Aecumulated but undrawn earnings____ 30.581.79 
rrotal -------------------------------------------------------- 52,268.25 
B. Valuation as a going concern as of 
June 30, 1960 : 
Testimony of Professor Stuart as 
to valuation as a going concern 
$135,000 X 6o/a% X 6 ----------------------------$ 54,000.00 
Aecun1ulated but undrawn earnings____ 30,581.79 
Total -------------------------------------------------------- 84,581.79 
C. Salvage Yalue: 
1. lT nder valuations contended for 
by plaintiffs : 
Rolling stock ------------------------------------$254,450.00 
Franchises ---------------------------------------- 365,000.00 
~ims Realty Co. real property ______ 152,100.00 
Other assets of Sims Realty Co.____ 11,088.44 
782,638.44 
Less agreed excess of liabilities 
over other assets ---------------------------- 34,017.09 
748,621.35 
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X 6o/3 % X 6 ........................................ 299,448.54 
Plus accumulated and undrawn 
earnings ··············----·····-············--·-··-· 30,581.79 
Total ···-······-···--·····-------------------·-······-- 330,030.33 
Less a reasonable cost of salvage ~ 
·Total -----------------------·------------------------ ~ 
2. Under valuations contended for 
by defendants : 
Rolling stock ------------------------------------ 122,996.77 
Franchises ---------------------------------------- 50,000.00 
Sims Realty Co. real property______ 89,000.00 
Other assets of Sims Realty Co.____ 11.088.44 
273,085.21 
Less agreed excess of liabilities 
over other assets ---------------------------- 34,017.09 
Total -------------------------------------------------- 239,068.12 
X 6% o/o X 6 ---------------------------------------- 95,627.~.! 
Plus accumulated and undrawn 
earnings -------------------------------------------- 30,581.79 
Total -------------------------------------------------- 126,209.03 
Less a reasonable cost of salvage ~ 
T·otal ------------------------------------------------
3. Salvage Values set by the trial 
Court: 
Sims Realty, Inc.- realty ............ $105,000.00 
Rolling stock ------------------------------------ 175,000.00 
Investments -------------------------------------- 3,312.00 
Intangibles ---------------------------------------- 150,000.00 
$328,312.00 
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D. < Hlu•r bases of valuation: 
1. Snm paid to .T ohn Si1ns: 
$10,000 X 6--------------·-·····-············--------$ 60,000.00 
., Value agreed upon by plaintiffs 
in 1959 after death of l\I. K. Sims : 
$18,000.00 X 6 ----------··-···----------------···· 108,000.00 
3. \' alue based upon Elmer Si1ns 
purchase $280,000 minus accrued 
hut undrawn earnings of defend-
ants, $84,252.37 ········--------················ 195,747.63 
X 6% )'c X 6 ----------······-········--·-----------· 78,298.80 
Plus accrued but undrawn 
earnings of plaintiffs -------------------- 30,581.79 
Total ···-················----------···············----- 108,880.59 
-!. Based upon inheritance tax 
appraisal: 
$370,850 minus accumulative earn-
ings of defendants x 6o/3 o/o x 6______ 118,639.20 
Accumulated earnings of 
plaintiffs --------------····-····--------------------· ·30,581.79 
Total ·············----------------------------------··· 149,220.99 
In each instance the amount shown would be less 
the $48,000.00 already paid to the plaintiffs by Salt Lake 
Transfer Company. 
The defendants urge that the court reverse the lower 
Court's holding and declare the defendants entitled to 
recover judgment based upon the 1932 valuation plus 
cumulative earnings, or a total of $52,268.25, minus 
$48,000 already paid, or a balance of $4,268.25. 
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If the court orders a valuation as of June 3, 1960, 
the most persuasive evidence as to valuation of that date 
is the price paid to John Sims for his entire interest, 
including his interest in the accumulated and undrawn 
earnings, or a total of $60,000, minus $48,000, or a balance 
of $12,000. 
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